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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.980317-CA 
BRIAN STARKE Y, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions for assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995), interference with arresting officer, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995), and threat against 
life or property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for assault 
by a prisoner where two police officers testified that defendant head-butted one of them in 
the shoulder while they were booking defendant into jail? 
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Issue 2: Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for making 
a threat against life or property where defendant admitted and several police officers testified 
that defendant told an officer that he was going to "put a hit" out on the officer? 
Standard of Review: A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence must 
"marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this 
evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict." 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). An appellate court will reverse a 
conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence is so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime." Id. (citations omitted). 
Issue 3: Should this Court reach defendant's multiple claims of "judicial error" and 
"prosecutorial overreaching" where he did not timely object to the alleged errors below and 
where he has supplied no legal analysis in support of his argument? 
Standard of Review: Absent plain error, an appellate court will not review issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3 (Utah App. 1997). It is well-settled that "an appellate 
court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." State 
v. Thomas. 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 
313 (Utah 1998); Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9) (1999). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following controlling statues and rules are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (1995); 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); 
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Brian Starkey was charged in a February 1998 information with assault by 
a prisoner and damaging a jail, both third degree felonies, and with two counts of 
interference with arresting officer, five counts of threat against life or property, and one count 
of false information to law enforcement officer, all class B misdemeanors (R.04-02). At the 
preliminary hearing, the State voluntarily dismissed all but three counts: 1) assault by a 
prisoner, 2) interference with arresting officer, and 3) threat against life or property 
(R. 179:34-33). The trial court bound defendant over on the three remaining counts (R.39; 
R. 179:59). The State subsequently filed an amended information reflecting only those three 
charges (R.40-41). 
A jury convicted defendant of all three charges (R.93-92). Defendant moved to arrest 
judgment and for a new trial (R. 124-120; 137-40). The trial court denied both motions, 
ruling only that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict (R. 182:7; 182:9). 
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The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years for the 
assault by a prisoner conviction and two jail terms of six months for the interference with 
arresting officer and threat against life or property convictions (R.126, 154-52). The 
sentences were to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to any other 
prison sentences that defendant was then serving (R. 154-52). 
Defendant timely appealed his convictions (R.163). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a short stand-off with police, defendant threatened to "put a hit" out on a 
sheriffs deputy assisting in the arrest and then head-butted another deputy booking him into 
jail. The following details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State 
v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
The stand-off 
On February 25, 1998, Iron County Sheriffs Deputy Brett Allred assembled a team 
of five officers to execute a no-bail arrest warrant on defendant for attempted aggravated 
assault (R.181:13-14, 36-37, 91-92). Maryann Neal, a friend of defendant's, had called 
Deputy Allred earlier to tell him that defendant was at a certain residence in Enoch 
(R. 181:67,144-46). Deputy Allred had unsuccessfully tried to apprehend defendant the night 
before (R. 181:60). 
The officers arrived at the residence soon after 5:00 p.m. (R. 181:38-39,93). 
Concerned that defendant might flee, the officers positioned themselves strategically around 
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the house (R. 181:14,37-38). Deputy Allred hid in a neighbor's back yard behind some old 
parked cars (R. 181:3 8,39,93). Deputy Brown parked his marked police cruiser out of sight 
(R.181:93). Trooper Dunlap watched the roads outside the subdivision to protect the 
community and to stop defendant from fleeing in a vehicle (R. 181:31,37). Deputy Edwards, 
who lived less than a block away, surveyed the residence through binoculars from the 
windows of his home (R. 181:37,108-10). 
Deputy Schlosser, who did not know defendant, knocked on the front door (R. 181:14-
15, 39). Schlosser asked the young man who answered the door if defendant was there 
(R. 181:15). The young man turned to look at defendant who had just stood up (R. 181:15). 
Schlosser asked defendant his name and whether Brian Starkey was there (R. 181:15). 
Defendant told the officer that his name was "Doug" and that Brian had gone to Maryann's 
house (R. 181:15-16). 
Defendant and a woman in the home told Schlosser that he could look around 
(R. 181:16-17). Defendant ran out the back door when Schlosser went into another room 
(R.181:16-17). 
Deputy Allred stepped out from behind his hiding place and intercepted defendant 
(R. 181:39). Allred ordered defendant to the ground (R. 181:39). Defendant responded by 
immediately putting his hand in his waistband and bringing his other arm, which was draped 
by a coat, forward (R. 181:39-40). Allred drew his weapon and commanded defendant to 
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show his hands and to go to the ground (R.l81:39-40). Instead of obeying, defendant 
replied, "Shoot me. Just fiickin' shoot me" (R.l81:39-40). 
By this time, Deputies Brown and Schlosser had rounded the corner of the home 
(R. 181:18,40, 94). Brown and Schlosser also drew their weapons and with Allred formed 
a semi-circle around defendant (R. 181:19, 41, 43, 94-95). All the officers repeatedly 
ordered defendant to show his hands and to go to the ground (R. 181:19,21,40-41,111,155). 
Defendant refused, backed away from the officers, and said, "It's not worth going back. 
You're going to have to kill me" (R. 181:20-21, 41,43-44, 95). 
Meanwhile, Trooper Dunlap and Deputy Edwards, who was armed with a shotgun, 
arrived (R. 181:43,110-11). Edwards aimed his weapon at defendant and ordered him to put 
his gun down (R. 181:111). Defendant asked Allred to tell Edwards to put the shotgun down, 
but Allred refused and again commanded defendant to drop his weapon and get on the 
ground (R. 181:112). 
Deputy Allred eventually convinced defendant to surrender by promising that they 
would not tackle him in the muddy field (R. 181:20-21,41 -43,95-96). The officers allowed 
defendant to move to a nearby sidewalk and kneel down (R. 181:42-43, 96). Allred cuffed 
defendant's hands behind his back and then searched him for weapons (R. 181:45-46). 
Defendant had no weapons, but he admitted at trial that he had purposely placed his hand in 
his waistband to deceive the officers into believing that he had a gun (R. 181:46). 
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The threat 
After being cuffed, defendant began threatening and verbally abusing the officers 
(R. 181:21-22,47,96). He was particularly belligerent towards Deputy Edwards who by this 
time had put his shot gun away (R. 181:46,48,113). As the officers were leading defendant 
to a police car, defendant warned Edwards, "I'm going to put a hit out on you just like your 
brother" (R. 181:113, 22-23,49). When Edwards did not immediately respond, defendant 
went nose-to-nose with Edwards and said, "You're not going to make it through the night. 
You won't make it through the night. I'll see to it" (R.181:l 14, 49). 
Deputy Edwards took the threat seriously because he had known defendant four years 
and knew that he had "a large number of friends" (R.181:112-13,116). Edwards also knew 
that defendant had "spent a significant time in jail" where he had likely made friends 
(R. 181:113). Edwards was also struck by the "fire" in defendant's eyes when he made the 
threat (R. 181:113). Edwards was so upset after the incident that he refused to leave his wife 
and children at home alone that night to attend a previously planned banquet (R. 181:115-16). 
The assault 
While in the booking area of the jail, Deputies Allred and Brown had defendant stand 
against the wall while they completed paperwork (R.181:52-53, 99, 101). The deputies' 
backs were to defendant, whose hands were still cuffed behind him (R. 181:53, 55, 70,98). 
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Defendant began pacing back and forth and threatening "to get" the officers9 jobs 
(R. 181:52-53). Defendant also threatened Alfred's dog and family (R. 181:98-99). Deputy 
Allred asked defendant two or three times to stand over against the door (R. 181:99, 52-53). 
Defendant refused and continued to pace and verbally abuse the officers (R. 181:99,53,71). 
Finally, Brown turned and ordered defendant to "stand over against that door and stay 
there" (R. 181:99, 53). Defendant again reflised and told Brown to "[g]et out of my fucking 
face" (R.181:99, 53). 
The deputies decided to place defendant in a holding cell while they completed their 
paperwork (R. 181:54). Allred reached out to grab defendant's right arm while Brown tried 
to grab defendant's left arm (R. 181:54,99). As Allred touched defendant's arm, defendant 
lunged forward and head-butted Allred in the shoulder (R.181:54-57, 73, 100, 102). As 
Allred pushed defendant up against the wall, defendant continued to try to hit Allred with his 
elbow or shoulder (R. 181:56-57). Because defendant continued to actively resist, the two 
deputies took him to the ground (R. 181:58, 100). 
Two corrections officers then entered the room and helped Allred and Brown force 
defendant into a holding cell (R. 181:58,100-01). After removing defendant's boots from his 
kicking feet, the correction officers left him in the locked cell (R.181:58). 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault by a 
prisoner and threat against life or property convictions. This Court should decline to address 
these challenges because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and show how that evidence is legally and factually insufficient. In any event, when 
properly marshaled, the evidence before the jury was clearly sufficient to support both 
convictions. 
In his last point, defendant cursorily raises four claims of "judicial error" and 
"prosecutorial overreaching." Defendant has waived all those claims because he did not 
timely raise any of them below. Moreover, his brief does not comply with the requirements -
of rule 24(a)(9) in that he cites to little legal authority for his claims and engages in no . 
meaningful legal analysis. In addition, defendant has failed to show how any of the alleged 




THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT BY A 
PRISONER WHERE TWO POLICE OFFICERS 
TESTIFIED THAT DEFENDANT HEAD-BUTTED ONE 
OF THEM IN THE SHOULDER WHILE THEY WERE 
BOOKING DEFENDANT INTO JAIL 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for 
assault by a prisoner. Specifically, defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
show that defendant intended to cause bodily injury. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. 
Aplt."] at 9-11. To support this claim, defendant asserts that defendant did not hit Deputy 
Allred very hard with his head and that no one else, including Deputy Brown, actually saw 
defendant's head hit Alfred's shoulder. Br. Aplt. 9-12. 
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must marshal all the 
evidence that supports the jury's verdict and then show how this marshaled evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is legally insufficient to support the verdict. 
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 
(Utah App. 1994). Even then, a verdict will be reversed for insufficient evidence "only when 
the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Strain. 885 P.2d at 
819 (citations omitted). 
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Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Instead, he has merely argued selected 
portions of the evidence which he believes supports his position. This Court should therefore 
reject defendant's claim. See Pilling, 875 P.2d at 608 (reflising to entertain merits of 
insufficiency of the evidence claim where defendant failed to marshal evidence). In any 
event, when properly marshaled, the evidence supports defendant's conviction. 
To convict defendant of assault by a prisoner, the State had to prove that defendant 
was in custody and that he committed assault intending to cause bodily injury. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995).1 An assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates 
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1995). The jury was instructed only under subsections (a) and 
(b). 
Defendant does not dispute that he was in custody and therefore a prisoner. Thus, the 
only question is whether there was evidence to show that defendant, intending to cause 
bodily injury (a) attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Deputy 
Allred or (b) made a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence to do 
*Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 provides: "Any prisoner who commits assault, 
intending to cause bodily injury is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-101 (1995) defines "prisoner" as "any person who is in custody of a peace 
officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other penal institution." 
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bodily injury to Deputy Allred. Bodily injury means "physical pain, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(3) (1995). 
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to 
cause bodily injury to Deputy Allred or that he head-butted Deputy Allred. Br. Aplt. 8-11. 
To support this contention, defendant points to testimony suggesting that he did not hit 
Allred very hard, that Brown did not see him make contact with Allred, and that no one else 
saw the defendant trying to head-butt Allred. Br. Aplt. 8-11. The following marshaled 
evidence, however, shows that the State presented ample evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably infer that defendant not only committed assault by head-butting Allred in the 
shoulder, but also that he intended to cause bodily injury in doing so: 
1. Deputy Allred testified that as he and Deputy Brown attempted to place 
defendant in a holding cell, defendant head-butted Allred in the shoulder 
(R. 181:54-55, 70). With the help of the prosecutor, Allred physically 
demonstrated how defendant heat-butted him (R.l 81:55-56, 73). 
2. Allred testified that defendant's head struck him in the shoulder with some 
force (R.l81:56, 72-73). Although defendant struck Allred in the shoulder, 
Allred testified that he believed that defendant was aiming for his head 
(R.l81:56). Allred also testified that if defendant had been successful in 
striking his head, Allred would have likely sustained some bruising (R. 181:86-
87). " 
3. Allred testified that after the head butt, defendant continued to try to hit him 
with his elbow or shoulder (R. 181:56). 
4. Deputy Brown testified that he saw defendant try to head-butt Allred 
(R. 181:99, 104-05). Brown also stated that defendant made "a deliberate 
lunge forward" (R.l81:100). Brown testified that he thought defendant's 
lunge forward was an attempt to hurt one of the officers (R. 181:106). 
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5. Deputy Brown testified that just before the scuffle, defendant acted 
belligerently and, while pacing back and forth, threatened Allred, saying that 
Allred and his family were not safe and that Alfred's dog was "history" 
(R. 181:98). According to Brown, defendant continued to threaten the officers 
even after they took him to the ground (R. 181:100). 
6. Deputy Allred testified that defendant was still kicking his feet while corrections 
officers tried to remove his boots in the holding cell (R. 181:58). 
The jury could reasonably conclude from the foregoing testimony that defendant 
head-butted Allred in the shoulder and that he did so with the intent to cause Allred bodily 
injury or physical pain. Defendant's belligerence and threats both before and after the assault 
evidenced an intent to hurt Deputy Allred. Defendant's deliberate and forceful lunge toward 
Allred also demonstrated an attempt to physically harm the deputy. Defendant's continuing 
efforts to hit Allred with his elbow or shoulder after the head butt provided further evidence 
that defendant intended to cause Allred bodily injury. 
It is irrelevant that defendant was unsuccessful in harming Deputy Allred. Allred and 
Brown expressly testified that they both saw and felt defendant deliberately lunge forward 
to head-butt Allred. Under the assault statute, it was enough that defendant attempted to 
cause bodily injury; the State did not have to prove that he actually caused bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(a). It also does not matter that no one other than Allred and 
Brown saw the head butt or its attempt. Their testimony alone, which was evidently believed 
by the jury, was sufficient to establish that defendant deliberately head-butted Deputy Allred. 
See Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 44 n.6 (Utah 1998) (explaining that jury may choose 
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which witnesses to believe and may base verdict on testimony of one witness even when 
there are nine contradictory witnesses). 
In sum, as shown by the foregoing, defendant did not marshal the evidence. In any 
event, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the conviction for assault by a prisoner. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR THREAT AGAINST 
LIFE OR PROPERTY WHERE DEFENDANT 
ADMITTED THAT HE THREATENED TO PUT A "HIT" 
ON A POLICE OFFICER AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE 
TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT INTENDED THE 
THREAT TO CAUSE THE OFFICER TO BE FEARFUL 
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction 
for threat against life or property. Br. Aplt. 12-15. Specifically, he claims that the threat was 
no more than "idle talk" made in a fit of "transitory anger" and that there was no evidence 
that he intended the threat to place anyone in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Br. 
Aplt. 12-15. 
The Court should refuse to address the merits of this claim because defendant again 
fails to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict and show how that evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. Pilling. 875 P.2d at 608; Strain. 885 P.2d at 819; see 
discussion on marshaling requirement supra at 10-11. When marshaled, the evidence was 
plainly sufficient to support a conviction for threat against life or property. 
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To convict defendant of making a threat against life or property, the State had to prove 
that (1) defendant threatened to commit any offense involving violence and (2) the threat was 
made with the intent to place a person in fear of serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-107 (1995).2 The statute does not require an intent to carry out the threat or that the 
recipient of the threat actually be placed in fear. See State v. Fixel 945 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 
App. 1991) (holding Utah's analogous "threatening a judge" statute does not require that 
defendant intend to carry out threat); see also State v. Rodriguez, 569 N. W.2d 686,695 (Neb. 
Ct. App. 1997) (similarly worded terroristic threat statute does not require intent to execute 
threats or that victim be terrorized); Svkes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. Ct. App.) 
(effect of terroristic threat not essential element of offense), cert, denied by Svkes v. 
Minnesota, 119 S.Ct. 619 (1998); Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1996) (neither ability to carry out threat nor a belief by victims that it will be carried out 
2Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 states in full: 
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to 
commit any offense involving violence with intent to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency 
organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of 
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, 
automobile, or other form of transportation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the 
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place 
to which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated 
by a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 
Defendant was charged only under subsection (l)(b). (R. 40, 101). 
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essential element of crime). Rather, the statute only requires that a threat to commit a violent 
crime be uttered with the intent to cause the recipient to fear imminent serious bodily injury.' 
See FixeK 945 P.2d at 151 (analogous "threatening a judge" statute requires only that threat 
be uttered and that defendant have intent specified in statute); see also Cook v. State. 940 
S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting almost identically worded statute to 
require only making of threat with intent to place victim in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury); Commonwealth v. Ferrer, 423 A.2d 423, 424 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (interpreting 
similar terroristic threat statute to require only making of threat with intent to terrorize 
victim); State v. Carlson. 559 N.W.2d 802, 807 (N.D. 1997) (same). 
Defendant does not dispute that he uttered a threat of violence when he told Deputy 
Edwards, "Fm going to put a hit out on you just like your brother." He argues only that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to place Edwards in fear of serious bodily 
injury. Br. Aplt. 12-15. To support this claim, defendant asserts that his threat was uttered 
on the "spur of the moment" during a heated argument and was the result of mere "transitory 
anger." Br. Aplt. 12-13. Defendant then cites to decisions from Pennsylvania for the 
proposition that "spur-of-the-moment" threats resulting from "transitory anger" are excluded 
from criminality. See Commonwealth v. Ferrer. 423 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); 
Commonwealth v. Kidd. 442 A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
Defendant's reliance on Pennsylvania authority is misplaced. First, the official 
comment to the Pennsylvania terroristic threat statute specifically excludes "mere spur-of-
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the-moment threats which result from anger." Official Comment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706 
(1999); see also Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
In contrast, nothing in the plain language of Utah's statute excludes coverage of threats 
made in anger or on the spur of the moment. Rather, the statute plainly prohibits any threat 
of violence made with the intent to place the recipient in fear of serious bodily injury. 
Second, both Ferrer and Kidd, as well as other Pennsylvania decisions, make clear that 
evidence showing that a threat of violence was made with the intent to terrorize is sufficient 
to sustain a conviction even though the threat was arguably made in a fit of anger. Ferrer, 
423 A.2d at 424, 425 (nature of threat and surrounding circumstances of defendant's 
shouting at detective that his testimony would cost him one of his kids was sufficient to 
establish settled purpose to terrorize); Kidd, 442 A.2d at 827 (record insufficient to show 
defendant intended to place officers in state of fear where hand-cuffed defendant generally 
screamed and shouted at officers and threatened to kill them with a machine gun); Tizer, 684 
A.2d at 599-601 (defendant's threats to kill his brother during heated five minute 
confrontation were not spur-of-the-moment threats, but fell within purview of terroristic 
threat statute); Hudgens. 582 A.2d at 1355,1358 (defendant's threats "to get" victim during 
heated argument followed by drawing of sword was not spur-of-the-moment threat because 
victim was subjected to impairment of personal security targeted by statute). The focus of 
those decisions, like the focus of Utah's statute, is whether a threat of violence was uttered 
with an intent to terrorize or place the victim in fear. Once proof of those two elements are 
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met, it is irrelevant that the threat may have been made in "transitory" anger. See Carlson, 
559 N.W.2d at 807-08 (holding that critical inquiry under Nebraska terroristic threat statute 
is whether defendant intended to place others in fear for their safety and that a defendant's 
"transitory anger" is relevant only in that limited context). 
More important, the record here does not support defendant's claim that his threat was 
mere "idle talk" and only the product of "transitory anger" without any specific intent behind 
it. Indeed, the following evidence and reasonable inferences, ignored by defendant, show 
that defendant did intend to place Deputy Edwards in fear of imminent serious bodily harm: 
1. Although defendant made a number of general threats to the other officers 
at the scene, Deputy Allred testified that he was particularly belligerent 
towards Edwards (R.181:46-47). 
2. Defendant's threat to put out a "hit" or "contract" specifically targeted 
Edwards and even mentioned Edwards' brother (R. 181:23, 49, 113). Unlike 
the other generalized threats defendant made to the other officers, the threat 
against Edwards specified the means by which defendant would harm Edwards 
(R.181:22-23,47,49,96). 
3. Edwards testified that when he did not immediately respond to the threat, 
defendant got nose-to-nose with Edwards and stated, "You're not going to 
make it through the night. You won't make it through the night. I'll see to it" 
(R. 181:114). Deputy Allred verified that at one point defendant was almost 
touching noses with Edwards (R. 181:48). 
4. Edwards testified that he took the threat seriously because he had known 
defendant for four years and knew that he had a large number of friends and 
that defendant had spent a significant amount of time in jail, enabling him to 
make friends there (R.181:l 12-13, 116). 
5. Edwards testified that defendant had a "fire" in his eyes when he made the 
threat (R. 181:113). 
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6. Edwards finally testified that he was so upset after the incident that he 
refused to leave his wife and children home alone that night even though he 
had previously planned to attend a banquet (R. 181:115-16).3 
Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, but must be inferred from all the evidence. 
FixeL 945 P.2d at 152 n.4. Here, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the foregoing 
evidence that defendant uttered his threat intending to place Deputy Edwards in fear of his 
life. He did not make a similar threat to the other officers (R. 181:22-23,47,49,96). When 
Edwards did not immediately respond to this specific threat, defendant put more force behind 
it by getting into Edwards' face and threatening him again (R. 181:113-14). 
Also, the jury could have concluded that defendant's threat was a credible one as 
evidenced by Edwards' testimony that defendant had many friends, some with criminal 
records (R. 181:112-13, 116). Finally, Edwards' reaction of refusing to leave his wife and 
children at home alone that night provided further evidence that defendant not only intended, 
but succeeded in placing Edwards in fear of his physical safety. 
3In his brief, defendant states that Edwards responded to his threat with a single 
word, "whatever," thereby suggesting that Edwards did not take the threat seriously. Br. 
Aplt. 6. While it is true that Deputy Allred testified that this was Edwards' response 
(R. 181:49), defendant's brief ignores all the other testimony that Edwards did take the 
threat seriously (R. 181:112-16). As stated, in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, all the evidence is viewed together in the light most favorable to the verdict. See 
Pilling. 875 P.2d at 607-08. 
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In short, defendant has failed his marshaling burden by ignoring evidence that 
supports the verdict. When properly viewed, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
conclusion that defendant intended his threat to place Edwards in fear of his personal safety. 
POINT HI 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CLAIMS OF 
"JUDICIAL ERROR" AND "PROSECUTORIAL 
OVERREACHING" 
Defendant cursorily raises four issues in his last point: 1) that although the trial court 
sustained his objection to testimony that defendant had tried to hit Deputy Allred on a prior 
occasion, the court erred in not "striking" that testimony (Br. Aplt. 17-20); 2) that the trial 
court made prejudicial comments in front of the jury (Br. Aplt. 21-23); 3) that the prosecutor 
improperly asked defendant for details regarding a prior felony conviction under rule 609(a), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. Aplt. 20-21); and 4) that the prosecutor improperly used his 
rebuttal testimony to merely rehash the State's case-in-chief (Br. Aplt. 21). 
Defendant has waived all of these claims because he did not timely raise them below. 
Defendant also has not adequately briefed any of these issues. The Court should therefore 
refuse to address them. 
A. Defendant waived his claim that the trial court erred in not striking testimony. 
Background. The prosecutor asked Deputy Allred on direct examination how long 
he had known defendant (R.181:35). Allred replied that he had known defendant 
approximately four years and that all his contacts with defendant had been within the context' 
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of his job as a police officer (id.). The prosecutor then asked Allred to describe his first 
encounter with defendant (id.). The deputy testified that defendant's mother had called him 
to come to her home to explain the laws regarding dogs at large to defendant because his dog 
had just killed some ducks (id). Allred stated that while he was explaining the law to 
defendant, defendant tried to hit him (id.). Defendant immediately objected to the testimony 
as irrelevant and moved to strike (id.). 
After listening to the State's response, the trial court sustained the objection and the 
prosecutor continued his direct examination of Allred (R. 181:35). Although the trial court 
did not specifically rule on defendant's motion to strike, defendant did not at any time bring 
this to the court's attention (R. 181:35). 
Defendant complains for the first time on appeal that although the trial court sustained 
his objection, it did not formally strike the testimony that he tried to hit Allred. Br. Aplt. 19-
20. He asserts that the jury likely convicted defendant based on this unanswered allegation. 
Br. Aplt. 19-20. 
Waiver. "As a general rule it is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on 
the objection or such objection is waived on appeal." State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959,961 (Utah 
App. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549,552 n.2 
(Utah 1984) (court refused to reach issue appellant first raised in post-trial memorandum 
where no indication that trial court reached or ruled on issue); Brobergv.Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 
201 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court will not undertake to consider issue absent indication 
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in record that trial court reached or ruled on an issue). The purpose of this rule is to put "the 
judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time 
in the course of the proceeding." Broberg, 782 P.2d at 201. 
Here, the trial court sustained defendant's objection of irrelevance to the testimony, 
but in what appears to be an oversight, did not specifically rule on defendant's motion to 
strike (R. 181:35). It behooved defendant at that time to ask the court to rule on his motion 
to strike. Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 961. At the very least, defendant could have broached the issue 
at any time during the trial and asked the court to specifically inform the jury that the 
testimony was stricken and should not be considered by them. This would have allowed the 
judge to timely correct any perceived error instead of leaving defendant with a hidden issue 
for appeal. Under the circumstances, defendant has waived this issue. 
Inadequate briefing. Even if defendant had properly preserved his claim, he has not 
adequately briefed it. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an 
appellant to include in his brief "the contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues 
presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
This Court has repeatedly refused to consider arguments which, in contravention of this rule, 
are not adequately briefed. See, e.g.. State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991). 
Citing only to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and a single case, State v. 
Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), defendant merely asserts that Deputy Allred's testimony 
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that defendant had tried to hit him on a prior occasion was inadmissible and that it's 
admission unfairly prejudiced him. Br. Aplt. 17-20. Defendant makes no mention of the 
applicable standard of review and the fact that Doporto was overruled by a 1998 amendment 
to rule 404(b).4 See State v. Decorso. No. 960512, slip op. at 4-11 (Utah June 4, 1999). 
Defendant also fails to engage in any meaningful analysis of why Alfred's statement 
was inadmissible under rule 404(b). A reviewing court is "entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited." State v. Thomas, 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999) 
(citations omitted); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). An 
appellate court is not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
4After Doporto, rule 404(b) was amended to read: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to pro\e the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identify, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amendment in italics). The advisory committee notes state that the Utah Supreme 
Court, by emergency rule, effective February 11, 1998, amended the rule to "abandonf] 
the additional requirements for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. 
Doporto. 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997)." The notes further explain that the amendment was 
intended to return to the traditional application of Rule 404 prior to Doporto. See State v. 
Decorso. No. 960512, slip op. at 4-11 (Utah June 4, 1999) (affirming the purpose of the 
amendment was to overrule the rule 404(b) analysis adopted by Doporto and explaining 
the appropriate standard of review and analysis under that rule. 
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burden of argument and research." Thomas, 974 P.2d at 272 (citations omitted). Because 
defendant has not adequately briefed this issue, this Court should decline to address it.5 
B. Defendant waived his claim that the trial court made prejudicial comments before 
the jury. 
Background. On direct examination, the prosecutor attempted to question Deputy 
Allred about threats that defendant had allegedly made against Allred's police service dog 
(R. 181:33-34). Defendant successfully objected to this line of questioning as it did not relate 
to any of the charges before the jury (R. 181:34). In cross-examining Allred, however, 
*Even if defendant had preserved and adequately briefed this issue, he has not 
shown how the trial court's failure to formally "strike" Allred's statement adversely 
affected the outcome for him. State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 126 (Utah App. 1987) 
(court will not reverse conviction unless error is harmful, i.e., that absent error there is 
reasonable likelihood of more favorable outcome to defendant). Although the court did 
not use the word "stricken," sustaining an objection on the ground of irrelevancy would 
have informed the jury that the statement was not relevant to the case and therefore 
should not be considered by them. 
Moreover, the jury heard without objection so much other evidence of defendant's 
prior misconduct that it is unlikely that Deputy Allred's single allegation had any real 
impact on the jury's verdict. For example, the jury heard that officers were trying to 
serve a no-bail arrest warrant on defendant for attempted aggravated assault (R. 181:64, 
81-82, 91-92); that Deputies Allred and Edwards had known defendant for years, all 
within the context of their employment as police officers (R.181:88-89, 113); and that, 
according to defendant, Edwards had arrested him on another charge two years previously 
and later insinuated to defendant's former girlfriend that defendant was a drug dealer (R. 
181:152-53). Defendant tried to use this evidence to show that the officers were biased 
against him (R. 181:60, 63, 65-66, 152-53, 155). Given this other testimony, the jury was 
bound to infer that defendant had a history of being in trouble with the law and of 
attempted aggravated assault even if Allred had not made the complained-of statement. 
In short, given that defendant's objection was sustained and that Allred's statement 
was not particularly inflammatory within the context of all the testimony, it is unlikely 
that the court's failure to formally "strike" that statement had any appreciable impact on 
the outcome of trial. 
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defendant began to explore charges dismissed at the preliminary hearing (R. 181:65). After 
Allred denied telling defendant that he was going to charge defendant with every charge he 
could think of, defendant questioned Allred about the probable cause statement that 
supported the original information which charged defendant with twelve criminal counts (R. 
181:65). Specifically, defendant questioned defendant about the damage to a jail charge 
which had been dismissed at the preliminary hearing: 
Q [by defense counsel]: Now, you indicate on this [probable cause] statement 
that uAfter Mr. Starkey was in a holding cell, he continued to make threats 
towards myself, family and job. Then he started to damage the holding cell." 
A: Correct. 
Q: And based upon that probable cause statement, Mr. Starkey was originally 
charged with a felony offense of damage to a jail cell; is that correct? 
[Prosecutor]: Objection, your Honor. I don't see any relevance of charges that 
are not even present today. That we're not even dealing with. We're wasting 
the jury's time. 
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, it clearly goes to motive. This officer has 
testified that he didn't make statements to the effect that, "I'm going to charge 
you with everything I can." Yet he swears out a probable cause — 
The Court: I will allow — you've opened the door. We'll go back into 
everything that was dismissed at preliminary hearing. If they have any 
incriminating evidence, they could put that on, and that counts. Do you want 
to try it on that charge as well? We won't add a count, but if they have 
anything that they could counter your exploring this area with, they can go into 
that. It won't be irrelevant. Go ahead. 
(R. 181:65-66). Defendant then went on to establish that he had not damaged the jail, but 
that another inmate had (R. 181:66-67). 
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Defendant complains on appeal that the trial court's comments in overruling the 
State's objection improperly informed the jury that damaging a jail was not the only charge 
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant asserts that this suggested that 
the State may have other incriminating evidence, thereby "interject[ing] the same type of 
prejudice that attends the introduction of all types of "prior bad acts" evidence." Br. Aplt. 
23. 
Waiver Defendant has waived this claim because he did not timely raise this issue 
below. Defendant let the court's comment pass with no request for relief at any time during 
the trial. Defendant first raised this issue in his motion for a new trial (R181:65-66;R.138). 
The trial court, however, did not reach the merits of this issue, but simply ruled that the-
motion for a new trial was denied because there was sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict (R.159; R. 181:5, 9). This was not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See 
Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that 
issue raised for first time in post-trial motion is not preserved for appeal where trial court 
merely denies post-trial motion without holding evidentiary hearing or addressing merits of 
issue); Cunningham, 690 P.2d at 552 n.2 (refusing to reach issue first raised in post-trial 
memorandum where no indication that trial court reached or ruled on issue); cf State v. 
Belgard. 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (issues raised and dealt with in post-trial 
evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 
(Utah 1991) (same). This Court should therefore decline to address this issue. 
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Inadequate briefing. Defendant has also inadequately briefed this issue. Defendant 
cites to no legal authority and engages in no legal analysis in support of his claim that the 
trial court's statements prejudiced him. Br. Aplt. 21-23. He merely asserts that the trial 
court's "allusion to other crimes which the defendant had been previously charged with and 
of which the prosecutor may have other 'incriminating evidence' had the natural tendency 
to interject the same type of prejudice that attends the introduction of all types of'prior bad 
acts' evidence." Br. Aplt. 23. In view of defendant's failure to cite to any legal authority or 
to develop his argument, this Court should decline to review this issue. State v. Yates, 834 
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991).6 
C. Defendant waived his claim of a rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, violation. 
Background. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if he had any 
prior felony convictions (R.181:163). Defendant responded that he had one prior felony 
6In any event, defendant has also failed to demonstrate how the court's comment 
prejudiced him. There was nothing inherently prejudicial in the trial court's comment, 
within the context it was given. The court merely pointed out to defendant that by 
addressing counts dismissed in the preliminary hearing, he was opening the door for the 
State to counter with any incriminating evidence it might have with respect to those 
charges (R. 181:65-66). The jury had already been alerted by defendant that he had been 
charged with other counts (R. 181:64). Indeed, a primary theme of the defense was that 
Deputy Allred had grossly and unfairly overcharged defendant, thereby proving that 
Allred had an axe to grind with defendant (R.181:64-65, 152-53, 162). Also, the jury 
heard all of defendant's conduct with respect to the final three charges, thereby making it 
irrelevant that he might have been charged with other matters. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to fathom how the court's statement, even if improper, could 
have prejudiced defendant. 
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conviction for witness tampering (R. 181:163). Without objection, the prosecutor inquired 
into the details of the conviction (R. 181:163). In response, defendant explained that he had 
"flipped off and thrown a trash bag at a witness in a proceeding against defendant's ex-
girlfriend (R. 181:163). 
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly inquired 
into the factual basis for the prior conviction. Br. Aplt. 20-21. 
Waiver. As explained, an appellant may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal. 
See State v. Nelson. 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986) (absent any indication that this issue 
was raised at trial, it cannot be considered for first time on appeal).7 Defendant did not 
object to the prosecutor's questioning about the prior conviction or ask for any kind of relief 
below. This Court should therefore refuse to address the merits of defendant's claim.8 
D. The State did not present improper rebuttal. 
In a three-sentence paragraph, with no cites to the record, defendant asserts that the 
State improperly used rebuttal testimony to do nothing more than allow Deputy Allred to tell 
7An issue not raised below may be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. State 
v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3 
(Utah App. 1997). Defendant, however, has not argued plain error. See State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 1992) (court will not consider issue raised for first 
time on appeal when appellant did not argue plain error). 
8As with the other claims, even if defendant had preserved the issue he has not 
shown prejudice. Defendant's explanation of the witness tampering charge actually 
minimized his conduct and made it sound much less serious than the crime of witness 
tampering. 
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his side to the jury one more time. This Court should refuse to address the merits of this 
claim because defendant never objected below to the State's rebuttal testimony (R. 181:186-
90), and because he has not adequately briefed the issue on appeal. Moreover, defendant 
mischaracterizes the State's rebuttal case. Only Deputy Allred testified on rebuttal 
(R. 181:186-90). His testimony was short and confined to responding only to matters raised 
by defendant (id.). The Court should therefore reject this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 




ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
29 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of ~JUA^ , 1999,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to: 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
Attorney for Appellant 
1071 East 100 South, Bldg. D, Suite 3 




Statutes and Rules 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily 
injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of 
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other 
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles 
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the 
confinement is legal. 
76-5-107. Threat against life or property — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to 
- commit any offense involving violence with intent to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency 
organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of 
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or 
other form of transportation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the 
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to 
which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated by 
a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim [but see notes below 
regarding the 1998 amendment]. Provisions of 
this rule apply to character evidence to prove 
conduct, as distinguished from proof of charac-
ter where character is an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was compa-
rable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1977) (character evidence as to the character of 
the victim of a homicide was admissible to 
rebut the defendant's contention that the de-
ceased was the aggressor). One significant dif-
ference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no 
provision for the use of character evidence in 
civil cases, except where character is the ulti-
mate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 autho-
rized the use of character evidence in civil cases 
not only on the ultimate issue but where other-
wise substantively relevant. See Boyce, Char-
acter Evidence: TTie Substantive Use, 4 Utah 
Bar J. 13,18-19 (1976). However, Rule 48, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded 
character evidence with respect to a trait as to 
care or skill. The Advisory Committee to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence concluded that the 
remaining justification for the admission of 
character evidence was so insignificant that 
character evidence in civil cases should not be 
admitted unless it was in issue. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55. 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).-State v. 
Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce, 
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 
Utah Bar J. 31(1977). 
This amendment [the 1998 amendment, ef-
fective February 11, 1998] abandons the addi-
tional requirements for admttting evidence un-
der Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto, 
935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). It clarifies that 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, of-
fered under 404(b), is admissible if it is relevant 
for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirement of Rules 402 and 403. 
Utah's existing Rule 404 is otherwise identi-
cal to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 and 
the equivalent rule in most other states. This 
amendment to the rule is not intended to de-
part from the meaning and interpretation given 
to the equivalent rule in other jurisdictions, but 
to return to the traditional application of Rule 
404 prior to Doporto. 
Amendment Notes. — The Supreme Court 
of Utah, by emergency rule, effective February 
11,1998, amended this rule by adding the last 
sentence to Subdivision (b). See the Advisory 
Committe Note above explaining the amend-
ment. 
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 404. as amended, 
was approved by the Supreme Court of Utah as 
an emergency rule effective February 11, 1998. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references.! 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
